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Electoral Dynamics in Indonesia: Money Politics, Patronage and Clientelism 
at the Grassroots
Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati, eds.
Singapore: NUS Press, 2016.
A central theme in the debate regarding Indonesian politics after democratization concerns its 
underlying logic.  Democracy qua institution promises a heightened mobilizational power of the 
demos, and thus some scholars argue the salience of political participation in contemporary Indo-
nesian politics.  The implication is that institutional logic underpins post-New Order Indonesia 
(Pepinsky and Ford 2014).  Some other scholars, however, propose that democracy does not 
necessarily come with such empowerment of the people.  The institutional effect of democracy can 
go hand in hand with oligarchy, defined as a form of politics where wealth defense is its central 
motive (Winters 2011).  The financially endowed few, who wield disproportionate material power 
to protect their oftentimes non-democratic interest, can hijack democracy in this kind of politics 
(Hadiz and Robison 2004; Winters 2011).  Indonesia after democratization, according to this camp 
of scholars, is one such case of entanglement between oligarchy and democracy.  Not surprisingly, 
accompanying the presence of competitive elections since 1999 in Indonesia is the recurrent refer-
ence to “money politics,” especially at the local level (see, for example, Erb and Sulistyanto 2009).
The central contribution of Edward Aspinall and Mada Sukmajati’s edited volume is its pio-
neering effort to clarify such so-called money politics.  More specifically, this remarkable book 
describes the varieties of electoral strategies that involve the distribution of material benefits as 
well as the central mechanism through which politicians wield their material power to win an elec-
tion.  These themes have arguably been neglected in the literature despite the abundant references 
to money politics in Indonesia.
The authors of the book operationalize money politics into concepts such as patronage and 
clientelism and scrutinize voter-politician linkages during Indonesia’s 2014 legislative election. 
Patronage is defined as the material benefit politicians distribute to voters in exchange for political 
support in the form of votes.  Relatedly, clientelism is defined as a personalistic relationship within 
which that material benefit is distributed.  Patronage distribution must meet three additional 
requirements, however, to qualify as clientelism.  These requirements are: (i) reciprocity on the 
part of voters in the form of political support, (ii) the hierarchy of power relations between politi-
cians and voters, and (iii) iteration, understood as the ongoing nature of their relationship (pp. 3–4).
With the distinction drawn between patronage and clientelism and their relationship made 
explicit, it is possible to conceive that not all patronage distributions qualify as clientelistic.  Some 
are not clientelistic since not all patronage is reciprocated by political support in the form of votes. 
Also, very few practices of patronage distribution are built upon personalistic, face-to-face inter-
action between voters and candidates.  Even fewer such distributions develop into ongoing relation-
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ships.  These tensions inherent in patronage distribution, especially one regarding achieving 
reciprocity on the part of voters, are well captured by the analytical purchase of the two concepts. 
In addition, the two concepts enable us to ask empirical questions such as: What are the strategies 
that politicians employ to ensure reciprocity from voters?  This excellent conceptual groundwork 
of the book serves as the foundation for a set of 22 empirical chapters documenting dynamics of 
patronage distribution during the 2014 election campaign.  The rich and textured narratives in each 
chapter speak volumes about the rigorous ethnographic method the authors employ.  Unifying all 
these chapters are several key findings that compose the primary value of the book.
First, the book codifies the varieties of patronage found during the grassroot campaigns.  Of 
all possible forms of patronage, outright vote buying is the most common.  A set of chapters cover-
ing West, Central, and East Java (Chapters 13, 14, 15, and 16) mainly document vote buying in 
remarkable detail, including the social legitimacy accorded to it by voters.  Despite its illegality, 
voters accept the practice of vote buying and take it as either an expression of gratitude on the part 
of candidates or a means to punish their alleged corrupt behavior (pp. 245–247).  The terms utilized 
to euphemize the distribution of money are numerous, including uang makan (food money), uang 
pulsa (money for mobile phone credit), uang lelah (literally “tired money,” meaning money to 
compensate for labor performed), and uang transport (transport money) (p. 93).  This set of chapters 
is a novel contribution to the empirical literature on Indonesian electoral politics.  Other varieties 
of patronage that the book registers include individual gifts to voters in the form of consumables 
and merchandise bearing the name and image of candidates, community services such as free 
medical checkups, club goods such as donations to targeted communities, and pork barrel projects.
Second, the book demonstrates that patronage distribution is not merely one among many 
campaign strategies of candidates in the 2014 legislative election.  It is the dominant mode of cam-
paigning.  All chapters register the practice of patronage distribution as the dominant strategy, with 
only a few candidates trying to refrain from engaging in this practice.  Even those candidates who 
pledge not to buy votes end up distributing some form of patronage (see Chapter 18 by Ahmad 
Muhajir, covering South Kalimantan).  It is, therefore, largely a question of what kind of patronage 
candidates distribute rather than whether candidates engage in patronage distribution at all.
Third, the central mechanism of distributing patronage in Indonesia is dominantly informal 
networks of vote brokers rather than party machines.  This intermediary actor between voters and 
politicians is commonly referred to as tim sukses, or success team.  The informal networks of tim 
sukses are preferable to party machines since they often have close personal relationships with 
voters.  These close relationships between tim sukses and voters elicit trust as well as “the feeling 
of gratitude and obligation” that helps mitigate the problem of reciprocity after patronage distribu-
tion (p. 29).
As the introduction of this review has mentioned above, the entanglement of democracy and 
oligarchy is a central theme in contemporary Indonesian politics, which this book helps to clarify. 
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The cases of Blora and Southeast Sulawesi, for example, demonstrate that local oligarchs, or 
politico-business elites, are the dominant players in the election game (see Chapter 15 by Zusiana 
Elly Triantini, and Chapter 20 by Eve Warburton).  In the case of Blora, they are the very actors that 
introduced vote buying in the 2004 legislative election.  A decade after, vote buying had become 
an established practice in Blora (p. 252).  Sabet, a local term in Blora for brokers, are the actors 
helping local oligarchs as candidates distributing patronage.  This patronage might take the form 
of goods, cash, or even services such as holding a local volleyball competition (pp. 252–253).
Intensity of patronage distribution, however, does not guarantee victory to candidates.  As 
Eve Warburton demonstrates in her excellent chapter on Southeast Sulawesi, a materially power-
ful local oligarch could lose despite the huge amount of money he distributed days before the 
election (pp. 348, 358–360).  In the context of various candidates employing a similar strategy of 
patronage distribution, the strength of local networks that brokers mobilize makes a difference. 
Vote buying alone cannot guarantee victory since the amount of money that candidates wield to 
win an election does not necessarily correspond to the number of votes they project to gain.  Can-
didates always get fewer votes than they initially expect.  Thus, only candidates that have both 
money and active networks, or basis, come up victorious.
The book explicitly limits its aim to presenting descriptive accounts of the dynamics of patron-
age distribution.  However, it is not without opportunities for theory building.  These opportunities, 
unfortunately, are left unexploited and are only suggested as a further research avenue (pp. 34–37). 
For example, consider the following theoretical questions regarding the organizing logic underly-
ing the distribution of patronage.  Under a condition of the uncertainty of where and to whom to 
distribute patronage, what explains the decision of brokers to target a specific demographic and 
not others?  Relatedly, under the condition of multiple patronage distribution from various candi-
dates, what explains the decision of voters to cast votes for certain candidates and not others?  It 
seems that ethnicity and religion play a significant role in answering these two related questions, 
as the cases of the legislative election in Medan and Bangka Belitung suggest (see Chapters 4 and 
5 respectively).  Brokers in the two regions tend to distribute patronage to targeted religious or 
ethnic groups that share their candidates’ ethnic or religious background.  This strategy of ethno-
religious targeting (pp. 74–77) is intended to ensure victory in areas that demonstrate potential as 
their voter base.  Similarly, voters in the two regions in the context of patronage distribution by 
several candidates tend to cast their votes for candidates who share their religious or ethnic back-
ground.
This minor comment regarding a possible addition to the book should by no means be taken 
as discounting the value of the book.  Aspinall and Sukmajati’s edited volume undoubtedly is a 
major empirical contribution to the study of Indonesian democracy as well as patronage and clien-
telism in the context of developing countries.  Students of Indonesian electoral politics will engage 
and build their work upon this pioneering volume.
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Yearning to Belong: Malaysia’s Indian Muslims, Chitties, Portuguese 
 Eurasians, Peranakan Chinese and Baweanese
Patrick Pillai
Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2015.
What are the experiences of ethnic minority communities in present-day Malaysia?  How do they 
negotiate their often multiple and fluid identities with national policies and politics that are based 
primarily on ethnicity?  Patrick Pillai, drawing on years of fieldwork in different locations in 
 Peninsular Malaysia and long-term interactions with ethnic communities, provides valuable obser-
vations on not one, but five cases of less-studied minority communities in Yearning to Belong: 
Malaysia’s Indian Muslims, Chitties, Portuguese Eurasians, Peranakan Chinese and Baweanese. 
This book investigates Indian Muslims in Penang, Chitties and Portuguese Eurasians in Malacca, 
Peranakan-type Chinese in Terengganu, and Indonesians from Bawean Island, all in one volume. 
This itself is an admirable achievement as such a variety often comes from an edited volume by 
multiple contributors, yet Pillai manages to pull them all together, assembling historical back-
grounds, second literatures, and firsthand data to create a panoramic picture of ethnic relationships 
in Malaysia today.
We start with the first group, Indian Muslims in Penang, in Chapter 1.  After a brief history 
covering the precolonial and colonial eras, the chapter looks at the religious and cultural impacts 
of this long-standing Muslim community on Malaysian society, in the form of religious buildings, 
political leadership, and intellectual influence as well as aspects of everyday life such as food and 
language.  It then focuses on the identity challenge of the community, which finds itself in an 
awkward position being Muslim yet not ethnic Malay (although the constitutional definition of 
Malay itself is not strictly an ethnic one).  Due to this ethnic ambiguity, Indian Muslims are often 
